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There are occupational disparities in the risk of contracting COVID-19. Occupational characteristics 
and work addresses play key roles in tracking down “patient zero”. The present descriptive analysis 
for occupational characteristics and management measures of sporadic COVID-19 outbreaks from 
June to December 2020 in China offers important new information to the international community 
at this stage of the pandemic. These data suggest that Chinese measures including tracking down 
“patient zero”, launching mass COVID-19 testing in the SARS-CoV-2-positive areas, designating a 
new high or medium-risk area, locking down the corresponding community or neighborhood in 
response to new COVID-19 cases and basing individual methods of protection on science, are 
effective in reducing transmission of the highly contagious SARS-CoV-2 across China.  
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The novel severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is primarily transmitted 
through respiratory droplets1, or direct contact with contaminated objects/surfaces2, 3, resulting in 
the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) as its hallmarks 4-9. COVID-19 outbreaks not only highlighted 
the vulnerability of many patients and residents, but also the limited clinical support that led to 
international headlines. The World Health Organization (WHO) declared “public health emergency 
of international concern” and “pandemic of COVID-19” on Jan. 30, 2020 and Mar. 11, 2020, 
respectively10-13. By January 26, 2021, more than 100 million COVID-19 cases have been reported 
in more than 188 countries, resulting in over 2.14 million deaths worldwide. 
With much of the world still in the grips of the pandemic COVID-19, importation of the SARS-
CoV-2 virus poses a great potential threat to epidemic prevention and control in China. Though 
China took a number of strict measures to prevent importing the virus via inbound travelers and 
imported goods over the past few months, local sporadic outbreaks of COVID-19 were reported 
from June 2020 to January 2021. In these new sporadic outbreak regions, detection of “No. 0 source 
of infection” is crucial work. It is well known that there are occupational disparities in the risk of 
contracting COVID-1914. Occupational characteristics and work addresses of “patient zero” play 
key roles in tracking down “No. 0 source of infection”15. We collected and analyzed data on 
occupational characteristics and management measures tackling COVID-19 in China. 
 
Methods Publicly available information was compiled from announcements by local authorities 
from the China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Health Commission in 
Tianjin, Beijing, Qingdao, Dalian, Shenyang, Shanghai, and the WHO. We also searched reports 
from the media and announcements from the local Municipal Health Commissions related to patient 
zero or cold-chain food transmission infection control from June to January 2021. Also, we collected 
literature using the PubMed database and Cochrane Library from June 1, 2019 to January 31, 2021. 
Search terms included “patient zero” and “novel coronavirus” or “COVID-19” or “2019-nCoV.” 
 
Results 
Occupational distribution of “patient zero” in local sporadic outbreak regions 
Tracing “No. 0 source of infection” is crucial work in new sporadic outbreak regions. From June to 
December 2020, the occupational distribution of patient zero in local sporadic outbreak regions with 
COVID-19 is shown in Figure 1. Data of identified “patient zero” in new sporadic outbreak regions 
is presented in Table 1. From June to December 2020, 5 cities in China had reported over 9 “patient 
zero”, including 2 confirmed cases and 7 asymptomatic cases (Figure 2, Table 1). These “patient 
zero” may be involved in cold-chain environment-to-human transmission of COVID-19 (Table 1). 
For the outbreak in Kashgar and Shanghai, the source of the epidemic was frozen or wet containers 
outside the border and their “patient zero” was container stevedore who was asymptomatic. 
In addition, plaza business hall staff (1) in Urumqi (Jul 15), supermarket employees (1) in Shenzhen 
(Aug 14), truck driver (1) in Hong Kong (Jul 26) and Food delivery staff (1) and food production 
workers (8) in Beijing (Jun 21) were diagnosed as confirmed cases (Figure 1). 
 
Detection of SARS-CoV-2 on imported frozen raw foods and their packaging materials across 
China 
Since the beginning of June 2020, at least ten incidents of food contamination have been reported 
across the country, where SARS-CoV-2 was detected on imported frozen raw foods, mostly on their 
packaging materials (Figure 3). During the outbreak in Beijing, 5 fish swab samples related to 
imported cold chain food (Salmon) tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid in the Xinfadi 
market and the virus genome sequence obtained from one unopened fish swab sample was highly 
homologous to the virus in human and environmental samples in this epidemic. As for the outbreak 
in Qingdao, the live SARS-CoV-2 virus was successfully isolated from the imported frozen cod 
package surfaces. 
In addition, the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 was found on frozen food surfaces, packaging 
materials and food storage environments in many cities, for example Dalian (Jul 3), Xiamen (Jul 3) 
Shenzhen (Aug 12), etc. 
 
Epidemiological characteristics and occupational distribution of sporadic nosocomial 
COVID-19 infections 
Epidemiological characteristics and occupational distribution of sporadic nosocomial COVID-19 
infections is presented in Table 2. From June 2020 to January 2021, 6 hospitals in China had reported 
over 23 confirmed cases. Among them, nursing staff (3), doctors (4), cleaner (1), patients (4) 
accompanying staffs (9) and logistics support staffs (2) were diagnosed. Route of infection mainly 
included workplace accidental exposure to COVID-19, nosocomial infection between healthcare 
workers and patients, family member exposure with COVID-19, cold-chain environment-to-human 




A main finding of the occupational characteristics of new sporadic outbreaks with COVID-19 from 
June 2020 to January 2021 in China was central to tracking down “patient zero”. Here we offered a 
first description of the occupational distribution of “patient zero”, epidemiological characteristics 
and the occupational distribution of sporadic nosocomial COVID-19 infections. Chinese 
management measures including tracking down “patient zero”, launching mass COVID-19 testing 
in SARS-CoV-2-positive areas, designating a new high or medium-risk area, locking down the 
corresponding community or neighborhood in response to new COVID-19 cases and basing 
individual methods of protection on science, were all found to be effective in rapidly reducing 
transmission of the highly contagious SARS-CoV-2 across China. 
 
Based on the WHO’s definition, transmission classifications of the contagious disease include no 
confirmed cases, sporadic cases, clusters of cases and community transmission. Sporadic cases are 
defined as cities/areas with one or more cases, imported or locally detected. Clusters of cases refer 
to cities/areas experiencing cases, clustered in time, geographic location and/or by common 
exposures. Community transmission are defined as cities/areas experiencing larger outbreaks of 
local transmission defined through an assessment of factors including, but not limited to: (1) Large 
numbers of cases not linkable to transmission chains; (2) Large numbers of cases from sentinel lab 
surveillance; (3) Multiple unrelated clusters in several areas of the country/cities/areas16. Based on 
the above analyses, we suggest that SARS-CoV-2 infections in 6 cities belong to new sporadic 
outbreaks of COVID-19 from June 2020 to January 2021 in China. 
 
In new sporadic outbreak regions, tracing “patient zero”, also known as the index case, is important 
work. “Patient zero” refers to the first human infected by the virus in a new outbreak region, which 
may be one or more confirmed/asymptomatic cases. Tracking down “patient zero” could provide 
new insights for epidemiologists and local authorities about the nature of first transmissions into a 
population and to understanding the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus behind the ongoing global health 
crisis and how to curb further transmission17. In many hard-hit regions, it was difficult to know how 
the SARS-CoV-2 virus got there or who contracted it first18. But in new sporadic outbreak regions, 
we recommend that identifying “patient zero” may be more useful. Our data showed that 5 cities in 
China reported over 9 “patient zero” from June to December 2020. 
 
The potential role in environment-to-person transmission spread of COVID-19 highlights the 
importance of detecting “No. 0 source of infection” and tracking down “patient zero”. Jones et al19 
reported the shedding of SARS-CoV-2 in feces and urine and its potential role in person-to-person 
transmission and the environment-based spread of COVID-19. Our data showed that imported 
frozen raw foods and their packaging materials tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid, 
suggesting that “No. 0 source of infection” and “patient zero” are involved in cold-chain 
environment-to-human transmission of COVID-19. 
 
The outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 virus places medical staff at an increased risk of infection as they are 
in close contact with patients with COVID-1920-22. Effective control of SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
between healthcare workers and patients is important during a period of community prevalence of 
COVID-1921. Dantes et al23 reported that delayed recognition of community transmission of covid-
19 resulted in healthcare worker infections. Jones et al24 showed that the proportion of both 
asymptomatic and symptomatic healthcare workers (HCWs) testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 
rapidly declined to near-zero between 25th April and 24th May 2020, which corresponded to the 
decline in patient admissions with COVID-19 during the ongoing UK “lockdown”, suggesting that 
infection prevention and control measures may help prevent hospitals from becoming independent 
'hubs' of SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Our data indicated that Chinese scientific measures could 
effectively curb the nosocomial spread of the COVID-19. 
 
In conclusion, the present analysis of occupational characteristics and management measures of 
sporadic COVID-19 outbreaks from June 2020 to December 2021 in China offers important 
information to the international community. Chinese scientific measures including tracking down 
“patient zero” or “No. 0 source of infection”, launching mass COVID-19 testing and individual 
methods of protection based on science are crucial strategies to curb further spread of COVID-19 
and prevent the importation of the SARS-CoV-2virus via inbound travelers and imported goods. 
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Figure 1: Geographical and occupational distribution of local sporadic outbreak cases with 
COVID-19 from June to December 2020. 5 cities (Dalian, Tianjin, Qingdao, Kashgar and 
Shanghai) reported the “patient zero”. For the outbreak in Kashgar and Shanghai, the source of the 
epidemic was frozen or wet containers outside the border and their “patient zero” was container 
stevedore who was asymptomatic. Plaza business hall staff (1) in Urumqi (Jul 15), supermarket 
employees (1) in Shenzhen (Aug 14), truck driver (1) in Hong Kong (Jul 26), Food delivery staff 
(1) and food production workers (8) in Beijing (Jun 21) were diagnosed as confirmed cases. 
 
 
Figure 2: The graph’s left-right axis (dates from June to December 2020) is used as a timeline 
of the key events and dynamic profile of “patient zero” during the local sporadic COVID-19 
outbreak. From June to December 2020, 5 cities in China had reported over 9 “patient zero”, 
including 2 confirmed cases and 7 asymptomatic cases. 
On October 27, NHC issued Q&A of COVID-19 prevention and control Technology Guide for cold 
chain food production and COVID-19 prevention and Control Disinfection Technology Guide for 
cold chain food. The contents include hygiene management measures at the source of cold chain 
goods, prevention and control requirements in the process of production and processing, prevention 
and control requirements in the process of sales and operation, cleaning and disinfection operations 
in the process of cold chain food production and processing and precautions for disinfection of 
equipment or surfaces of environmental objects. 
On November 27, the Chinese Ministry of Transport issued a comprehensive guideline to lower the 
risk of virus transmission via cold chain logistics 
 
 
Figure 3: ARS-CoV-2 detection on imported frozen raw foods and their packaging materials 
across China. During the outbreak in Beijing, 5 fish swab samples related to imported cold chain 
food (Salmon) tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid in Xinfadi market. As for the outbreak 
in Qingdao, the live SARS-CoV-2 virus was successfully isolated from the imported frozen cod 
package surfaces. The SARS-CoV-2 was also found on frozen food surfaces, packaging materials 
and food storage environments in many cities, for example Dalian (Jul 3), Xiamen (Jul 3) Shenzhen 
(Aug 12), etc. 
